1000 TIT BITS ON DISCIPLINE -196
829. QUESTION OF BIAS IN THE INQUIRING AUTHORITY
It is of paramount importance that the inquiry in a disciplinary case is conducted by a person who has an open mind and is expected to conduct the inquiry in an objective and impartial manner.
Accordingly, the inquiry cannot be entrusted to a person :
(i) Who has deep rooted bias against the employee [Tilak Chand v. Kamla Prasad Shukla, (1995) Supp.1 SCC 21).
(ii) Who is personally interested in result of the inquiry [Rattan Lal Sharma v. Managing Committee, Dr. Hari Ram Gupta (Co-ed.) School, (1993)4 SCC 10]. In this case, the person who had made the complaint was also a member of the inquiry committee.
(iii) At whose instance the disciplinary proceedings were started (ibid.)
(iv) Who is a witness against the delinquent official [State of U.P. v. Mohd. Nooh, AIR 1958 SC 86].
(v) Who has any pecuniary interest in the case. The reason is given by the Supreme Court in Rattan Lal Sharma case, supra, as - “If a person has a pecuniary interest, such interest, even if very small, disqualifies such person.”
(vi) Who has pre-judged the issues [Narayana Rao v. State, AIR 1958 A.P. 636).
(vii) Where there is a close relationship between him and one party [Annamalai v. State, AIR 1957 A.P. 739].
(viii) Where there was history of personal litigation on seniority matters. [Mantosh Kumar Dev v. Union of India, (OA-612/86 d. 13.6.1988) CAT-Cal.]
829. QUESTION OF BIAS IN THE INQUIRING AUTHORITY
It is of paramount importance that the inquiry in a disciplinary case is conducted by a person who has an open mind and is expected to conduct the inquiry in an objective and impartial manner.
Accordingly, the inquiry cannot be entrusted to a person :
(i) Who has deep rooted bias against the employee [Tilak Chand v. Kamla Prasad Shukla, (1995) Supp.1 SCC 21).
(ii) Who is personally interested in result of the inquiry [Rattan Lal Sharma v. Managing Committee, Dr. Hari Ram Gupta (Co-ed.) School, (1993)4 SCC 10]. In this case, the person who had made the complaint was also a member of the inquiry committee.
(iii) At whose instance the disciplinary proceedings were started (ibid.)
(iv) Who is a witness against the delinquent official [State of U.P. v. Mohd. Nooh, AIR 1958 SC 86].
(v) Who has any pecuniary interest in the case. The reason is given by the Supreme Court in Rattan Lal Sharma case, supra, as - “If a person has a pecuniary interest, such interest, even if very small, disqualifies such person.”
(vi) Who has pre-judged the issues [Narayana Rao v. State, AIR 1958 A.P. 636).
(vii) Where there is a close relationship between him and one party [Annamalai v. State, AIR 1957 A.P. 739].
(viii) Where there was history of personal litigation on seniority matters. [Mantosh Kumar Dev v. Union of India, (OA-612/86 d. 13.6.1988) CAT-Cal.]
830. On the other hand, where presence of bias could not otherwise be shown, the following circumstances cannot, ipso facto, lead to a presumption of bias on the part of inquiry officer and, hence, holding of inquiry by him would be valid.:
(i) Where the inquiry officer happens to be a subordinate of the disciplinary authority (Karuna Das v. State of Assam, 2005 Lab. IC 136 (Gau.)]. The Court observed – "In every departmental proceeding, the Enquiry Officer is likely to be a Subordinate Officer of the Disciplinary Authority. Unless a prejudice is shown or any biasness on the part of the Officer is indicated during the course of the enquiry, it will not be open for a delinquent officer to raise such a grievance after imposition of penalty." (para 12)
(ii) The status of the inquiry officer is inferior to that of the disciplinary authority [Ram Naresh v. State, AIR 1967 All. 384).
(iii) That the inquiry officer and charged officer were of equal ranks. Although, the Supreme Court has stressed that where practicable the inquiry officer higher in status than the charged officer should be appointed (Pankajesh v. Tulsi Gramin Bank, (1997)7 SCC 68).
(iv) That he had placed the employee under suspension (Rameshwar Singh v. Union of India, LLJ (1963) 1 p. 796].
(v) That he had issued charge sheet to the employee. The reason is that the principle, a prosecutor cannot be a judge, is not strictly applicable to the departmental inquiries, since the disciplinary authority, if it so desires, can hold the inquiry itself also (see Province of Bombay v. Kushaldas, AIR 1950 SC 222; K.S. Rao v. State, AIR 1957 A.P. 414).
(vi) That he was cited as a defence witness before his appointment as an inquiry officer (P.K. Swamy v. S. Railway, AIR 1969 A.P. 155].
(vii) That he was the investigating officer (M.V. Jogarao v. State, AIR 1957 A.P. 197] or had held the preliminary inquiry (D.A. Koregaonkar v. State, AIR 1958 Bom. 167). But if he expresses his definite opinion holding the delinquent employee guilty of the misconduct attributed to him, he will be disentitled to be appointed as an inquiry officer since he had pre-judged the issues [Narayana Rao v. State, AIR 1958 A.P. 636).
(viii) That he had appeared for the management in some cases before the Labour Court or in the inquiry proceedings (Bans Raj v. Sir Ganga Ram Hospital, W.P. (C) No. 12036/2009 d. 5.10.2009 by Delhi High Couri].
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